Publications
Why Hide? Africa's Unreported Debt to China. 2023. Review of International Organizations.
Abstract
Hidden debt is endemic throughout the sovereign credit market and poses a serious threat to global financial stability. Yet, little is known about how or why governments conceal their liabilities from creditors. I argue that governments intentionally hide debts from international financial institutions to maximize their ability to borrow while avoiding punishment for rising debt burdens. IFIs frequently penalize governments in low-income countries for borrowing beyond their means. By hiding debts, governments continue borrowing while avoiding creditor punishment. I test this using recently released data that reveals half of Chinese loans in Sub-Saharan Africa are missing from sovereign debt records. I find that borrowing governments hide loans to avoid violating World Bank debt thresholds. Further, governments hide less debt while under IMF scrutiny, reducing the risk that they will be discovered and punished. These findings offer evidence that borrowing governments use hidden debt as a strategic tool to pursue fiscal goals, often to the detriment of international organizations working to maintain global financial stability.
Pre-print version published August 2022 in the AidData Working Paper series #120
The gendered effect of war exposure on children; an exploration of conflict and post- conflict experiences. (with Roos Haer). 2024. International Journal of Human Rights.
Abstract
Armed conflict has tragically become commonplace in the lives of many children around the world. Children do not only witness and experience conflict but are also sometimes forced to participate. Recently, scholars from different fields have examined the consequences of war exposure for children, but few have considered the experiences of girls or have compared these experiences to those of boys. This is surprising given the increased focus of the international community on the protection of girls. This explorative study attempts to overcome this by examining the consequences of armed conflict and the potential gender differences along a continuum from the time during armed conflict to their experiences in the aftermath of war. In doing so, we rely on 350 structured interviews with Congolese boys and girls. Some of these children were actively involved in armed groups in the Eastern provinces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, while others have merely witnessed or experienced political violence. This work has important consequences for the study of the effect of conflict on children, the role of girls during and after conflict, and the international policy community.
Ethnic politics and sovereign credit risk. (with Matthew DiGiuseppe and Patrick Shea). 2023. Review of International Political Economy.
Abstract
How does domestic politics affect sovereign credit risk? To date, scholars have largely focused on how economic interests along class-cleavages influence sovereign default risk and borrowing costs. Ethnic dynamics are another important political factor that explains governments' creditworthiness, yet are understudied. We investigate how ethnic politics shape governments' credit access and argue that the fiscal incentives generated by ethnic coalitions influence credit risk differently than those created by class cleavages. Because ethnic coalitions are usually smaller than class coalitions, left governments with ethnic support can commit to lower spending and receive more favorable risk assessments. Right governments that rely on ethnic support, however, will have greater spending demands because of their need to satisfy ethnic groups. We test our argument using a new indicator of government ethnic support and four indicators of sovereign credit risk. We find that, in emerging markets, the borrowing costs of right governments increase as they become more dependent on ethnic groups for political support. Our findings suggest that financial markets are attuned to multiple dimensions of domestic politics and demonstrate that ethnic divisions can have strong implications for governments' access to credit.
Local food price volatility and educational attainment in Sub-Saharan Africa. (with Roos Haer and Gudrun Øtsby). 2023. Population and Development Review.
Abstract
How is education attainment affected by economic insecurity? In this study, we argue that volatile food prices limit access to education for children. Low-income households are highly sensitive to local price changes, and sharp increases in the cost of food staples can force families to substitute education to smooth consumption. Earlier research has linked price volatility caused by conflict or crisis to poor development outcomes but has focused on national trends or food producers using commodity price shocks and agricultural conditions. Instead, we take an individual approach and examine how a child’s education is affected by the food prices their household faces at the local market. Empirically, we combine educational measures of 40 Demographic Health Surveys of 14 sub-Saharan African countries between 1991 and 2020 with geolocated consumer food prices. We estimate a discrete approximation of a duration model based on a linear probability model and determine the cost of food while respondents were of school-age. Our results show that children are up to 8% more likely to drop out when local food prices increase. Notably, this effect is strongest for older children, especially boys. This work demonstrates how instability in childhood can have long-run adverse effects on individuals and has important implications for our understanding of the human capital costs of income crisis.
Age and Support for Public Debt Reduction. (with Alessia Aspide, Matthew DiGiuseppe, and Alexander Slaski). 2022. European Journal of Political Research.
Abstract
Many scholars and policymakers see rising debt burdens in the industrialised world as the product of ageing populations. Prominent theoretical models of government debt accumulation -- used to justify fiscal rules and austerity measures -- explicitly assume that support for debt reduction decreases with age. While such models have been influential, the fundamental relationship between age and preferences for debt has not been tested empirically. We test this argument but further theorize that the relationship between age and debt preferences is non-linear. While the elderly have a clear preference to ignore debt burdens, we add that the young should also prefer to delay reckoning with high national debts given their low income and expectations of higher future earnings. Using survey data (N=225,086), we find that age does have a modest, non-linear impact on concern for national deficits and debt burdens. Middle-aged respondents are most concerned about debt reduction, while the young and old view reducing government debt as less of a policy priority. Notably, the relationship is strongest in countries with more generous old-age benefits.
Culture and European Attitudes on Public Debt. (with Alessia Aspide, Matthew DiGiuseppe, and Alexander Slaski). 2022. New Political Economy.
Abstract
Popular media and politicians have often blamed the high public debt of some EU countries on cultural differences. These claims are most apparent in the discourse contrasting ostensibly prudent Northern Europeans with spendthrift Southern Europeans. Despite the prominence of these and similar narratives and evidence that culture plays a nontrivial role in other economic outcomes, there is no systematic evidence that culture influences attitudes towards sovereign debt in the EU. We provide the first empirical test of this claim using over 233,000 responses to a Eurobarometer question about the salience of national debt. Our analysis reveals that national and sub-national differences explain very little of the variance in debt preferences. Further, the differences that do emerge do not fit existing cultural narratives. Additional analysis reveals that established measures of national culture or religious observance, at the national and regional level, do not correlate with debt attitudes as cultural arguments would predict.
Working papers
Is the IMF a scapegoat? A survey experiment in Kenya. (with Rodwan Abouharb, Matthew DiGiuseppe, and Bernhard Reinsberg). Working paper, 2024.
Abstract
Many scholars and practitioners have proposed that leaders ‘scapegoat’ the IMF for unpalatable economic reform programs often undertaken during times of economic crisis. However, there is limited evidence that these tactics are effective in shifting citizens’ blame onto the IMF, or that they protect the government from public protest or electoral punishment. This research note seeks to test the micro-foundations of the scapegoat hypothesis with a high-powered online survey experiment in Kenya. Our study provides two insights. First, we find that blaming the IMF has small but significant effects on incumbent support. However, this effect is insignificant when respondents are also exposed to counter-narratives in which the opposition blames the government. Second, we find that blame is not zero-sum. While attributing blame to the IMF increases respondents’ own blame attribution to the IMF, it does not significantly reduce the blame placed on the incumbent. Overall, the results question the political utility of the scapegoating strategy.
IMF survival instincts: risk exposure and the design of loan programs. Working paper, 2024. Under review.
Abstract
When does the International Monetary Fund (IMF) play hardball? While some governments in distress are asked to make costly reforms in exchange for a bailout, others access emergency funds with ease. Previous work has attributed this variety to borrowing government characteristics; instead, I propose that the IMF's overall risk exposure determines the deal that each new borrower receives. As the global lender of last resort the goal of the IMF is to preserve financial stability, but it must also ensure its own solvency and survival. I argue that when a greater share of outstanding loans is owed by high-risk borrowers, the IMF mandates stricter policy conditions to protect itself from default. Using a new index of the IMF's risk exposure and several indicators of the design of loan conditions, I demonstrate that the IMF changes its lending behavior to protect its own balance sheet. During periods of high-risk exposure, the IMF requires that its borrowers complete more policy conditions across a broader scope of policy areas, increasing Fund control over repayment. These findings illustrate how the IMF's goal of self-preservation shapes emergency sovereign lending and contributes to ongoing debates about how bureaucratic interests influence the policy outputs of international organizations.
Works in Progress
Hiding from Austerity: Tax evasion during times of crisis.
Pleading poverty: Government manipulation and access to sovereign credit
Trade liberalization and sovereign debt burdens.